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Recent Developments
California v. Greenwood:
WARRANT NOT NEEDED FOR
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF
GARBAGE LEFT FOR COLLECTION
ON PUBLIC STREET.
In California v. Greenwood, _U.S~,
108 S. Ct. 1625, (1988), the United States
Supreme Court held that warrantless searches and seizures of garbage left for collection on a public street do not infringe
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy
under the fourth amendment. The Court
explained that a state law right to be free
from warrantless searches of trash, balanced against the cost of excluding reliable
evidence of criminal activity, does not
create a reasonable "privacy" expectation
that must be recognized under either the
fourth amendment or the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Billy Greenwood and Dyanne Van
Houten were arrested on felony narcotics
charges in early 1984 after police discovered quantities of cocaine and hashish
in the Greenwood home. Prior to the
search of the house, police received information indicating that Greenwood might
be engaged in narcotics trafficking. Acting
on the information received from a federal
drug enforcement agent, police conducted
a surveillance of the house. On two separate occasions, the police asked the regular
trash collector to pick up plastic garbage
bags left on the curb in front of Greenwood's house and to turn over the bags to
the police without mixing their contents.
During a search through the rubbish, the
Laguna Beach Police Department found
items indicative of narcotics use. An affidavit in support of a search warrant was
issued based upon the items seized. In the
respondent's presence, police discovered
controlled substances which subsequently
led to the arrest of Greenwood and Van
Houten.
Following his release, the police continued its surveillance of Greenwood during
which they observed many late night visitors to his residence. In the same manner
as before, the police searched garbage left
for collection by Greenwood and found
more evidence of narcotics use. Consequently, a second search warrant was exe-

cuted and while searching the house,
police found more narcotics and evidence
of narcotics trafficking and arrested Greenwood.
Finding that probable cause to search the
house would not have existed without the
evidence obtained from the trash searches,
the state superior court dismissed the
charges against the respondents under the
authority of People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d
357,486 P.2d 1262 (1971). That court held
that a warrantless search of trash bags violated the fourth amendment and the California
Constitution.
California v.
Greenwood, 108 S. Ct., at 1628 (1988). The
California Court of Appeals affirmed. The
appellate court noted that the "fruits of
warrantless trash searches could no longer
be suppressed" under the state's constitutional amendment eliminating the exclusionary rule regarding evidence seized in
violation of the California law but not federal law. Id. The court of appeals also
noted that under Krivda, "warrantless
trash searches were also to be excluded
.under federal law." Krivda, 182 Cal. App.
3d at 735, 227 Cal. Rptr., at 542, (quoted
in Greenwood, at 1628). At the same time,
the court granted Van Houten standing to
seek the suppression of evidence seized
during the first search of Greenwood's
home. Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. at 1629, n.1.
The state petitioned the California
Supreme Court to review the court of
appeals' decision; however, this petition
was denied. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed.
Writing for the majority, Justice White
focused on the issue of whether the fourth
amendment prohibited the warrantless
search and seizure of garbage left for the
collection outside the curtilage of the
home. In holding that the warrantless
search and seizure of garbage bags left at
the curb would violate the fourth amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their
garbage, Justice White declared that society does not recognize trash voluntarily discarded in areas suited for public inspection
as a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
Court reasoned that based on "common
knowledge that plastic garbage bags ... are

readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of
the public," it would not be reasonable to
expect trash to be free from intrusion. Id.
at 1628-29. In so holding, the Court rejected the respondents' main contention that
an expectation of privacy exists in garbage
left on the street for collection at a fixed
time, when contained in opaque plastic
bags, expected to be picked up with the
trash of others and deposited at the garbage dump. Id. at 1628.
In determining that the warrantless
search of garbage did not give rise to a
"societal expectation of privacy," the
Court declared that "an expectation of
privacy does not give rise to fourth amendment protection ... unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as
objectively reasonable." Id. The Court further determined that the respondents voluntarily left their trash for collection in an
area for an express purpose of conveying it
to a third party, the trash collector, who
might himself have sorted through it or
permitted others, such as the police, to do
so. Thus, a claim in the inculpatory items
discarded could not be subject to fourth
amendment protection. Id. at 1629.
Recognizing that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not subject to
fourth amendment protection, the Court
added that "police cannot reasonably be
expected to avert their eyes from evidence
of criminal activity that could have been
observed by any member of the public."
ld. Persuasive to the Court on this proposition were the holdings in the cases of
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) and
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
In Smith, the Supreme Court held that an
individual "has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties." Id. In Ciraolo,
the Court held that protection of the
home' under the fourth amendment had
never required police to obtain a search
warrant before conducting a surveillance
of the home, based on observations made
from a public vantage point where any
member of the public could make the same

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 19.1/ The Law Forum-29

observations. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that in Greenwood's case, an expectation of privacy in trash left on a public
street did not deserve protection from
police warrantless searches and seizures as
an expectation society was prepared to

honor.ld.
Rather, than conclude that Greenwood's
expectation had been frustrated, the Court
relied on the unanimous rejection of similar claims by the Federal Courts of Appeal.
In each of these cases, the courts found
that a reasonable expectation of privacy
did not exist with respect to trash discarded outside the home and the curtilage
thereof, thus being accessible to warrantless searches and seizures. Id. [Citations omitted.]
On the issue of whether an expectation
of privacy in garbage should be deemed
reasonable as a matter of federal law when
the warrantless search and seizure of garbage is impermissible as a matter of state
law, the majority stated that state law may
impose more stringent constraints in
police conduct involving searches than federal law. Id. at 1630. However, the Court
declared that "there is no such understanding with respect to garbage left for collection at the side of a public street." Id. at
1630-31.
Finally, the Court noted that evidence
obtained in violation of state law need not
be suppressed within the scope of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule when
the benefits of deterring police misconduct
do not outweigh the costs of excluding
reliable evidence of criminal activity. Id. at
1631. Since the state may eliminate the
exclusionary rule as a remendy for violations of that right, the majority held that
it may also adopt a similar balancing
approach in concluding that "the benefits
of excluding relevant evidence of criminal
activity do not outweigh the costs when
police conduct at issue does not violate federallaw." Id Therefore, the Court found
no merit in Greenwood's argument that
because California eliminated the exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation of state, but not federal law, the state
violated the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id.
Justice Brennan, with Justice Marshall,
dissented. Brennan opined that individuals
have the reasonable expectation that the
aspects of their private lives are concealed
safely in a trash bag free from examination
and inspection wherever they may be as
long as the contents are not in "plain
view," thus enjoying protection under the
fourth amendment. Id at 1633. In concluding that an expectation of privacy attaches to any container unless "it so clearly
announces its contents," the dissent
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argued that trash bags are to be afforded
fourth amendment protection. Citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981),
Brennan contended:
[E]ven if one wished to import such a
distinction into the fourth amendment, it is difficult if not impossible to
perceive any objective criteria by
which that task might be accomplished. What one person may put into a
suitcase, another may put into a paper
bag ... And ... no court, no constable,
no citizen, can sensibly be asked to distinguish
the
relative
"privacy
interests" in a closed suitcase, briefcase, portfolio, duffle bag, or box.

Id. at 426-27, quoted in California v.
Greenwood, at 1632.
The dissent found the majority's analysis
to be unpersuasive on the theory that trash
is abandoned and therefore not entitled to
an expectation of privacy. Brennan
explained that an expectation of privacy
cannot be negated when a person seeks to
preserve as private the disposal of refuge.
Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. at 1637. He reasoned
that the voluntary relinquishment of
possession or control over an item does
not lose fourth amendment protection,
even if placed in a mailbox, and therefore
the possibility of such an intrusion by
third parties should not justify a warrantless search by police. Thus, as viewed
by Brennan and Marshall, it was unreasonable for the majority to have concluded
that Greenwood had no expectation of
privacy in his trash. To hold that the warrantless search of disposed trash was consistent with the fourth amendment, the
court "paints a grim picture of our society." Id. at 1636-37.
In Greenwood, the Court failed to
address whether the curtilage question
should be resolved with particular reference to the proximity of the area claimed
to be "curtilage" to the home. Additionally, the Court did not give effect to the
fact that trash bags used by Greenwood
were opaque and not in "plain view," a
factor generally recognized as constituting
items free from police warrantless searches
and seizures under the fourth amendment.
While the Court rejected the notion that
an expectation of privacy may not extend
to garbage placed on a public street, and
that its contents may be seized without a
warrant, it necessarily follows that persons
engaged in noncriminal activity will no
longer be able to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance, as such
is an expectation no longer protected by
the courts as one society now honors.

-Gloria S. Wilson

B.N. v. K.K.: FRAUD, INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS,
AND
NEGLIGENCE
APPLICABLE WHEN RESULTING
FROM SEXUAL TRANSMISSIONS
OF DANGEROUS, CONTAGIOUS
AND INCURABLE DISEASE
In B.N. v. K.K, 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d
1175 (1988), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, in a case certified by the United
States District Court for the District of
Maryland, held that Maryland does recognize causes of action for fraud, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and negligence, resulting from the sexual transmission of a dangerous, contagious, and
incurable disease, such as genital herpes.
Each named cause of action, however, is
subject to the proper factual showing by
the plaintiff and any defense raised by the
defendant.
Ms. N. was employed as a nurse at Johns
Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland,
between July and December, 1983. Dr. K.
also worked at Hopkins Hospital for part
of that period. From July through
Ocotber, 1983, Ms. N. and Dr. K. "were
involved in an lntlIDate boyfriendgirlfriend relationship" and "engaged in
acts of sexual intercourse." Id. at 138, 538
A.2d at 1177. While this was going on, Dr.
K. knew he had genital herpes, but did not
disclose this to Ms. N., who neither knew
nor had any reason to believe that Dr. K.
was a carrier of genital herpes. Id On or
about October 1, 1983, Ms. N. and Dr. K.
engaged in sexual intercourse. On that date
Dr. K. knew that his disease was active and
would probably be transmitted to Ms. N.
through sexual intercourse. That result in
fact occurred and was caused by Dr. K.'s
conduct, inasmuch as Ms. N. never
engaged in sexual contact with anyone but
Dr. K. during the relevant period. Id at
138-9, 538 A.2d at 1177.
Ms. N. brought suit against Dr. K. in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligence and assault and battery. The
case was then certified to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland by the U.S. District
Court pursuant to the Maryland Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act,
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann., §§12601 through 12-609 (1984 Repl. Vol.).
The question certified asked:
Does Maryland Recognize A Cause Of
Action For Either Fraud, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, Or
Negligence Resulting From the Sexual
Transmission Of A Dangerous, Contagious, and Incurable Disease, Such As
Genital Herpes?

19.1---------------------------------

